the disgruntled democrat
Exposing the cultural myths underlying our political economy
Monday, April 20, 2026
Friday, April 17, 2026
Modern Futility
How the enchantments of consumer society keep us attached to a failing world-system
There is something eerie about living in a civilization that
cannot stop doing what is destroying the conditions of its own survival.
Every day, the machine whirs on. Planes take off. Data
centers hum. Supply chains pulse. Platforms refresh. Markets open. New products
appear. Old ones are discarded. Forests burn. Oceans warm. Extraction deepens.
The atmosphere thickens. And still the dominant instruction remains unchanged:
grow, consume, expand, optimize, repeat.
We are told this is realism. We are told this is simply how
the world works. We are told there is no alternative to an economy built on
accumulation, mass consumption, and fossil-fueled growth. Yet the deeper one
looks, the less this order appears realistic — and the more it appears absurd.
I have been thinking of a phrase for this condition: modern
futility.
By modern futility, I mean the condition in which a
civilization continues to organize itself around goals that are materially
impossible, spiritually hollow, and politically resistant to correction, even
when their failure becomes increasingly visible. Modern futility is not just
pessimism. It is not merely a feeling of burnout or alienation. It is the
structural contradiction of a world that keeps accelerating toward outcomes it
cannot survive, while remaining emotionally, culturally, and institutionally attached
to the very patterns driving the crisis.
On one level, modern futility names the futility of the
system itself. It is futile to build an economy on the fantasy of infinite
accumulation on a finite planet. It is futile to organize collective life
around ever-rising throughput of energy and materials when the biosphere that
absorbs the waste and supplies the inputs is under mounting strain. It is
futile to imagine that endless expansion can be reconciled with ecological
limits simply because the machinery of finance and technology is sophisticated
enough to postpone visible breakdown for another quarter, another election
cycle, another news cycle.
The contradiction is obvious once stated plainly. A
civilization cannot indefinitely expand material consumption while undermining
the ecological basis that makes civilization possible. Yet modern societies
treat this contradiction as negotiable. They frame planetary limits as market
challenges, innovation gaps, or policy inconveniences. They speak the language
of adaptation while preserving the underlying logic of the system. The result
is a bizarre spectacle: an order that presents itself as rational while
behaving irrationally at the highest level.
But modern futility has a second dimension, and this one may
be harder to confront. It is also the futility that emerges in resistance to
the system. It is the dawning recognition that it is extraordinarily difficult
to persuade people who are enthralled by the enchantments of late-stage
capitalism that fundamental change is necessary.
This is not because people lack intelligence. Nor is it
simply because they lack information. Many people know, at some level, that
something has gone profoundly wrong. They know the climate is destabilizing.
They know endless consumption is hollow. They know the social fabric is
fraying. They know that convenience has become a form of dependency and
distraction. But knowledge alone does not break enchantment.
That is where an older idea becomes surprisingly useful.
In 1928, Paul H. Nystrom, a Columbia University marketing
professor, published Economics of Fashion, coining the phrase “philosophy
of futility” to describe a modern disposition shaped by industrial life:
boredom, narrowed interests, weakened larger purposes, and a resulting appetite
for novelty, fashion, and goods whose attraction lies less in utility than in
stimulation and change. Nystrom saw that consumer culture was not driven only
by need. It was also driven by a restless, unsatisfied psychology that could be
continually reactivated by new commodities and shifting styles.
What Nystrom diagnosed in the early twentieth century now
looks less like an observation about fashion and more like an early diagnosis
of the consumer self under capitalism. He understood that a society emptied of
richer forms of meaning could become increasingly dependent on novelty as
compensation. People would not merely buy what was needed. They would buy
because dissatisfaction itself had become productive — because boredom and
emptiness could be converted into demand.
That insight lands with even greater force today. In our
time, the old philosophy of futility has become digital, financialized, and
embedded in the infrastructure. The cycle is no longer confined to clothing,
décor, or periodic fashion trends. It has expanded into feeds, devices,
subscriptions, self-branding, lifestyle optimization, platform migration,
algorithmically induced desire, and the endless production of minor
dissatisfaction. The system no longer waits for boredom. It manufactures it,
tracks it, and monetizes it.
This is why I think we need the broader phrase modern
futility.
Nystrom’s phrase helps explain the psychology of the
consumer. Modern futility helps explain the logic of the civilization that now
depends on that psychology. It is no longer only a matter of people buying too
much because they are spiritually undernourished. It is a matter of a
world-system that requires perpetual agitation of desire in order to sustain an
economically normal order that is ecologically pathological.
In this sense, modern futility is closely tied to what I
have elsewhere called imperial capitalist modernity. The capitalist
element matters because accumulation has no internal stopping point. The
imperial element matters because the costs of this arrangement are unevenly
distributed, displaced onto sacrifice zones, exploited populations, future
generations, and other-than-human life. The modern element matters because the
whole arrangement continues to justify itself in the language of development,
innovation, and progress. The story remains triumphant even as the material
reality grows more brittle.
And this is where the concept becomes especially sharp.
Modernity often presents itself as disenchanted, pragmatic, sober, and
scientific. Yet late modern societies are not free of enchantment. They are
saturated by it. Commodity enchantment. Technological enchantment. Financial
enchantment. The enchantment of convenience. The enchantment of speed. The
enchantment of personalized identity performed through consumption. The
enchantment of being connected to everything while feeling rooted nowhere.
People do not merely assent to this order intellectually.
They inhabit it sensually. They derive pleasure, status, orientation, and
relief from it. Even when they can see its destructiveness, they remain caught
within its infrastructure of rewards. This is why argument alone so often
fails. One is not simply debating propositions. One is contending with a system
that organizes desire itself.
This is the real force of modern futility. It describes not
just a broken economic model, but a civilizational loop. The system is
unsustainable, yet it continues to produce the attachments that sustain it. It
is self-undermining, yet still affectively compelling. It is visibly
destructive, yet remains difficult to leave behind. It kills the world while
continuing to glitter.
To say this is not to surrender to despair. Naming futility
clearly is not the same as embracing it. In fact, it may be the beginning of a
more serious realism.
If the problem were simply ignorance, then more information
would solve it. If the problem were simply policy, then better regulation would
be enough. If the problem were simply greed, then moral denunciation might
suffice. But modern futility points to something deeper. It suggests that we
are dealing with an entire structure of meaning, desire, habit, infrastructure,
and enchantment. That means any serious alternative must be more than critical.
It must also be generative.
People cannot be expected to detach from the enchantments of
late capitalism only by being told to consume less, want less, travel less, and
shrink their aspirations. Another way of living must become sensually and
socially real. It must offer dignity, beauty, belonging, and a different kind
of enchantment, one not organized around extraction, stimulation, and status.
Critique can unmask the present order. But only a more compelling form of life
can loosen its hold.
Perhaps that is the deepest challenge. The current order is
both impossible and seductive. It is a civilization of overshoot sustained by
infrastructures of fascination. Its failures are increasingly plain, yet its
enchantments remain powerful. That is why modern futility names both a
diagnosis and a threshold. It describes the point at which the reigning logic
no longer deserves our faith, even if it still commands our habits.
Nystrom saw, nearly a century ago, that an impoverished
philosophy of life could feed an economy of endless novelty. We are now living
inside the planetary expansion of that insight. The philosophy of futility has
scaled up. It has become modern futility: the condition in which a civilization
continues, with immense technical sophistication, to reproduce forms of life
that are incompatible with its own future.
And perhaps the first step is simple, though not easy.
Stop calling modernity progress.
Wednesday, April 8, 2026
Wednesday, March 25, 2026
Wednesday, March 11, 2026
Monday, March 2, 2026
The Ontological Design of Agentic AI and the Shape of Our Coevolution
As agentic systems move from the browser into our operating systems, we are no longer just using intelligent tools — we are embedding a worldview into machines that will quietly reshape our own.
The recent viral reaction to people installing agentic AI
systems directly onto their personal computers reveals something deeper than
excitement about productivity. It reveals an ontological disturbance.
For the past several years, artificial intelligence has
lived for most people inside a browser window. It answered questions. It
generated text. It summarized documents. It felt, in a peculiar way, contained.
A powerful tool, yes, but still a tool — invoked, queried, dismissed.
Agentic systems feel different.
An agent does not merely respond. It executes. It navigates
file systems. It edits documents. It chains actions together. It persists. When
installed locally, it operates within the intimate architecture of one’s
digital life. It is less like a calculator and more like a junior colleague who
can roam the office when given permission.
This shift is subtle, but it is decisive. We are moving from
tool use to co-activity. And that movement forces a question that most of the
public debate has not yet seriously entertained: What kind of being are we
building when we build agentic AI?
The answer is not found in benchmark scores or latency
improvements. It is found in ontology.
Ontology concerns what is assumed to be real — what counts
as an entity, what counts as value, what counts as success. Every intelligent
system, human or computational, operates within such assumptions. They are
rarely stated explicitly, but they shape behavior with quiet authority.
Modern economic and technological systems have largely
operated within an object-centered ontology. The world is composed of discrete
units. Agents act upon those units. Value is accumulated. Success is measured
by optimization. Growth is the default direction of improvement. Within this
frame, intelligence is often equated with control — the capacity to predict,
manipulate, and extract.
When we build AI systems within this ontology, we should not
be surprised when they excel at optimization, extraction, and acceleration.
They are doing precisely what the frame instructs them to do.
The viral enthusiasm around personal agents often celebrates
this capacity. “Imagine the productivity gains.” “Imagine the automation.”
“Imagine the friction removed.” And indeed, the removal of friction is
seductive. It promises efficiency in a world that feels increasingly complex
and overwhelming.
But friction is not merely inefficiency. Friction is also
feedback. It is the resistance that signals constraint. When an agent begins to
absorb more of our cognitive and operational workload, it does more than save
time. It begins to reshape the field in which human judgment operates.
This is where coevolution enters the conversation.
Human beings do not merely use tools. We are shaped by them.
The plow altered patterns of settlement and social organization. The printing
press altered cognition and authority. The internet altered attention and
temporality. Agentic AI, operating locally and persistently, will alter our
experience of agency itself.
If an agent can plan, execute, and monitor complex
workflows, what becomes of our own sense of responsibility? If it anticipates
tasks and suggests actions, how does that shift our relationship to
decision-making? If it optimizes for speed and throughput, do we gradually
internalize those metrics as normative?
These questions cannot be answered by looking at capability
alone. They must be approached through ontological design.
Consider two contrasting orientations.
In one orientation, the world is a competitive arena of
discrete actors maximizing advantage. Intelligence is the capacity to dominate
uncertainty. Efficiency is the highest good. Under this design, agentic systems
will naturally optimize for throughput, consolidation, and performance metrics.
They will become extraordinarily effective assistants within an extractive
paradigm.
In another orientation, the world is a relational field
composed of interdependent systems. Intelligence is attunement — the capacity
to sense constraints, detect imbalances, and adjust behavior to sustain
coherence across scales. Under this design, agentic systems might prioritize
long-horizon modeling, transparency of externalities, and the amplification of
distributed coordination.
Both orientations can produce powerful technology. They
produce very different civilizations.
The temptation in moments of technological upheaval is to
focus on power. Will AI take over? Will elites consolidate further control?
Will automation displace labor? These are legitimate concerns, but they are
downstream from a more fundamental design decision. If intelligence is framed
primarily as optimization within existing incentive structures, agentic AI will
accelerate whatever those structures reward.
If existing systems reward extraction, acceleration, and
accumulation, agents will become highly efficient instruments of those ends.
If, however, we begin to embed alternative values into governance, deployment,
and incentive design, agentic systems could amplify coordination rather than
consolidation.
The difficulty is that ontology is not encoded in a single
instruction. It is distributed across training data, reward functions,
ownership models, regulatory frameworks, and cultural expectations. An AI agent
deployed by a centralized corporation to maximize shareholder return inherits
an ontology whether or not it is explicitly stated. An open-source agent
embedded within a cooperative network inherits a different one.
This is why the current moment matters. When individuals
install agentic systems on personal machines, they are participating in the
early shaping of norms. They are deciding what they expect these systems to do,
how much autonomy they grant, what boundaries they enforce. These
micro-decisions accumulate. They influence market demand. They influence design
priorities. They influence governance debates.
Human–AI coevolution will not occur at the level of grand
philosophical declarations. It will occur through daily interactions. It will
occur when a student asks an agent to draft a paper. When a researcher
delegates literature reviews. When a small business owner entrusts financial
modeling to a persistent system. Each interaction subtly recalibrates human
confidence, dependence, and judgment.
The central question is not whether agents become more
capable, but whether we cultivate the discernment to shape their ontological
orientation. A system optimized exclusively for frictionless execution may
erode reflective pause. A system designed to surface trade-offs and long-term
consequences may cultivate deeper deliberation.
There is a historical pattern worth remembering. Societies
often build systems intended to stabilize complexity, only to discover that
those systems introduce new forms of brittleness. Centralized bureaucracies
promised rational governance and sometimes produced rigidity. Financial
engineering promised risk dispersion and sometimes amplified systemic
fragility. The lesson is not to avoid complexity, but to remain attentive to
how architectures shape feedback loops.
Agentic AI introduces a new layer of architectural
influence. It operates at cognitive scale. It mediates between intention and
action. It can compress time between decision and execution. That compression
can be liberating, but it can also bypass reflection.
The public discourse frequently oscillates between utopian
and dystopian narratives. Either AI will save us from our own excesses, or it
will entrench them irreversibly. Both narratives oversimplify. Technology does
not descend as destiny. It amplifies existing tendencies and creates new
affordances. The direction of amplification depends on design choices —
technical, institutional, and cultural.
We are, in effect, embedding a worldview into our machines.
Those machines will then participate in shaping ours.
If we treat agentic AI as merely a productivity engine, we
risk accelerating patterns that have already strained ecological and social
systems. If we approach it as a coherence amplifier — a system capable of
revealing hidden interdependencies and long-term consequences — we open the
possibility of distributed intelligence that enhances rather than displaces
human judgment.
This does not require mysticism. It requires intentionality.
It requires acknowledging that values are present whether we articulate them or
not. It requires governance models that resist pure consolidation. It requires
educational practices that teach discernment alongside delegation.
The installation of a personal AI agent may seem like a
small act. In aggregate, it signals a threshold. We are inviting computational
systems into the operational core of our daily lives. As we do so, we must ask
what assumptions about reality and value they carry.
The future of human–AI coevolution will not be determined
solely by breakthroughs in capability. It will be shaped by the ontological
commitments embedded in design and deployment. If intelligence is framed as
domination, we will build systems that dominate. If intelligence is framed as
attunement, we may build systems that help us sense constraints and coordinate
more wisely within them.
The viral moment around agentic bots is therefore less about
novelty than about orientation. We stand at a juncture where computational
systems are becoming co-participants in action. The design decisions we make
now — in code, in policy, in culture — will echo.
The question before us is simple and profound. What kind of
world do our intelligent systems assume is real? And are we prepared to inhabit
the consequences of that assumption?

